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Today’s age of data holds high potential to enhance the way we pursue and
monitor progress in the fields of development and humanitarian action. We
study the relation between data utility and privacy risk in large-scale beha-
vioral data, focusing on mobile phone metadata as paradigmatic domain. To
measure utility, we survey experts about the value of mobile phone metadata
at various spatial and temporal granularity levels. To measure privacy, we
propose a formal and intuitive measure of reidentification risk—the informa-
tion ratio—and compute it at each granularity level. Our results confirm the
existence of a stark tradeoff between data utility and reidentifiability, where
the most valuable datasets are also most prone to reidentification. When data
is specified at ZIP-code and hourly levels, outside knowledge of only 7% of a
person’s data suffices for reidentification and retrieval of the remaining 93%.
In contrast, in the least valuable dataset, specified at municipality and daily
levels, reidentification requires on average outside knowledge of 51%, or 31
data points, of a person’s data to retrieve the remaining 49%. Overall, our
findings show that coarsening data directly erodes its value, and highlight the
need for using data-coarsening, not as stand-alone mechanism, but in combina-
tion with data-sharing models that provide adjustable degrees of accountability
and security.
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1 Introduction
Large-scale datasets of human behavior are likely to revolutionize the way we develop cities,
fight disease and crime, and respond to natural disasters. However, these consist of sensit-
ive information, such as citizens’ geo-location, purchasing behavior, and socialization patterns.
Moreover, numerous studies have shown adversarial methods that can successfully associate
sensitive information in anonymized datasets to individual identities—i.e., reidentification (1–9).
Hence, understanding and managing the risk to privacy of these datasets still preconditions their
broad use and potential impact.
In this work, we consider mobile phone metadata as a paradigmatic example of what is col-
loquially referred to as ‘big data’. Due to its high granularity, high dimensionality, passive data
generation process, and high potential value, mobile phone metadata represents most character-
istic features of novel data types at the core of ‘big data’. Other such types include GPS tracks,
web browsing, financial behavior, genetic data, and satellite imagery; which share in common a
high potential societal value and concern for individuals’ privacy.
1.1 Mobile Phone Data for Development
Metadata is data about data. In the context of mobile phone usage, this represents a record that a
call was made—including a time stamp and geographic location, with precision determined by
the location of cell towers—but no information on the content of the call itself. Mobile phone
metadata is most commonly referred to as CDRs (Call Detail Records). Table 1 shows dummy
examples of call detail records of a couple of phone calls.
Table 1: Example of CDR records.
caller ID receiver ID tower ID time
299C20B41B32B5GH76C343 AEA595D43E2C9EE20EC12R 768 16-12-03 16:50
299C20B41B32B5GH76C343 C721FD9F5A8902BD1EE9C4 981 16-12-24 19:56
B8673E7C673FC9EZ958FB6 3ACC4FDDD29B45ZX1A2012 255 16-12-24 20:34
Relevant characteristics of CDRs are: 1) the caller and receiver identities are pseudonymized,
i.e., their phone numbers are replaced by anonymous pseudonyms (e.g., through hashing); and
2) the geographic location of towers used for each communication provide an approximation of
the user’s location.
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CDRs are a particularly pervasive and relevant data source for development and humanit-
arian response purposes. They are generated by standard telecommunication infrastructure, and
collected by mobile phone companies on an ongoing basis. Moreover, handsets and airtime
are becoming cheaper, leading to increased penetration and representativity, which by 2013 ap-
proached 89% in developing countries and 96% globally (10).
There are several ways in which the location information in mobile phone metadata is ana-
lyzed and used. For example, it is possible to build dynamic maps of population density and
population mobility in real time, over areas as large as countries, and at high geographic and
individual detail (11). This information in turn has valuable applications in a wide range of de-
velopment and humanitarian action domains, such as: disaster response upon earthquakes and
floods (12, 13), epidemic analysis of malaria and influenza outbreaks (14, 15), socio-economic
and poverty mapping in both the developed and developing worlds (16–18), transportation sys-
tems development (19), and improving national statistics (20).
1.2 Privacy Risk in Mobile Phone Metadata
In the recent past, privacy provided by pseudonymization coupled with institutional non-disclosure
agreements (NDAs) has served as basis to allow sharing of large CDR datasets. However, re-
search has recently shown adversarial methods that successfully associate sensitive information
in the datasets to individuals’ identities, even under pseudonymization of all personal identifi-
ers (1–9).
A seminal study on reidentification of CDRs analyzed mobility data from 1.5 million mobile
phone subscribers in a small western country, where the location of an individual was specified
hourly and with a spatial resolution given by the geographic distribution of the carrier’s antennae
(1). It demonstrated that outside knowledge of just four random spatio-temporal points were
enough to uniquely identify 95% of individuals in the database. Furthermore, the study showed
that data can be coarsened in order to reduce the likelihood of re-identification. This coarsening,
more properly named spatial and temporal generalization, is a key technique applied to data to
preserve privacy, allowing companies, NGOs, and public organizations to balance privacy risks
with data’s potential for positive societal impact.
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2 Methods
2.1 Assessing Privacy
Concepts and Vocabulary
Datasets contain attributes such as name, telephone, address, income, health status, location,
items purchased, and websites visited. These attributes can be classified as: direct identifiers,
quasi-identifiers, or sensitive attributes. For example, in an anonymous health database, where
names and social security numbers (direct identifiers) are pseudonymized, a prying third party
with access to the database could attempt to know the medical condition (sensitive attributes) of
Jane by using auxiliary information of her ZIP code and age (quasi-identifiers) to single her out.
We denote the set of auxiliary information about quasi-identifiers of person i by ai; and refer to
the subset of individuals whose records match ai as the equivalent class of i given ai, denoted
by Ei. Jane is reidentified if |Ei| = 1.
Traditional measures to protect privacy have focused on guaranteeing that an attacker, even
with full knowledge of an individual’s quasi-identifiers, is unable to reidentify her uniquely (21),
or extract information about her (22, 23). For example, a privacy approach of widespread use
in the last decade is k-anonymity (21), where the granularity of quasi-identifiers is gradually
reduced, thus increasing the size of equivalent classes, until the requirement min∀i |Ei| ≥ k is
met. These approaches, however, are incapable of coping with most behavioral datasets due to
their high-dimensionality (24), raising the need for appropriate ones.
Privacy in High-Dimensional Data
People’s online activity leaves a comprehensive data trace behind, which coupled with the ad-
vent of technologies for pervasive sensing, amount to an unprecedented instrumentation of our
societal systems. Notably, data at the core of today’s “big data” is high-dimensional. Examples
are human mobility data, banking and credit card data, consumer behavior, web browsing, online
social networks, and genetic data.
High-dimensional datasets contain only a sparse sample of the space of possible records,
which, similar to fingerprints, often entails that individual records are unique. To illustrate
how sparsity can be exploited for reidentification, consider a very large database of song lyr-
ics. The space of all possible song lyrics—permutations of a bounded number of words—is
extremely large. Thus, given a sequence of only 3 or 4 words, we are likely to identify a song
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uniquely among thousands. In practice, research has shown high reidentifiability in varied high-
dimensional datasets, from mobile phone records and credit card transactions to online movie
reviews (1, 4, 7).
Measures of Reidentifiability
Measures for assessing reidentification risk in high-dimensional data must recognize sensitive
attributes themselves as quasi-identifiers, and vice-versa, moving to a paradigm of partial ad-
versary knowledge as basis of reidentification. One such measure is unicity (1). The unicity
up of database D is calculated as the percentage of users in D who are reidentified by using
p randomly selected data points from each user’s records; i.e., the percentage of users whose
equivalent class satisfies |Epi | = 1. For instance, it was shown that outside knowledge of four
calls was enough to reidentify 95% out of 1.5 million individuals in a CDR dataset (u4 = 95%).
Here we elaborate on previous work and propose the following two metrics of privacy in
high-dimensional datasets. We aim at metrics that are meaningful and intuitive, as well as rooted
in the formal framework of information theory.
Information cost. Similar in spirit to unicity, we define the information cost of reidentific-
ation in D as the average quantity of outside information that suffices to reidentify users in D.
Let ci denote the number of data points drawn from user i’s records needed to reidentify her,
then information cost of D is defined as c = 1
n
∑
ci, where n is the number of users.
Information ratio. In addition, we define the information ratio r ofD as the average fraction
of a user’s data that is required to reidentify her. Let |di| with di ∈ D denote the amount of i’s
data in D, then the information ratio of D is given by r = 1
n
∑
ci
|di| . Relevantly, the information
ratio summarizes not only the amount of information needed for reidentification, but also the
amount of information gained by an adversary once a user is reidentified; where 1 − r is
the average information gain. This feature of the information ratio is highly relevant, as it
enables stakeholders to reflect over preferences accounting for both key elements of privacy
risk: information requirement and information gain.
These measures connect with information theory through the core concept of average in-
formation content—i.e., the entropy of multivariate distributions (25). In particular, the higher
the entropy of a dataset, the higher the information content of any bit of adversary knowledge,
and hence the fewer bits of information required for reidentification (lower information cost and
ratio). Moreover, the measures convey a meaningful and intuitive interpretation, which may help
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a broader audience reflect upon and assess both the likelihood and potential harm that reidenti-
fication entails. Below we apply these measures to the case of CDRs at several spatio-temporal
granularity levels.
1h 6h 12h 24h
Information cost   
1h 6h 12h 24h
Information ratio   
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Figure 1: Reidentification results. Reidentification results for datasets at varying levels of
spatial and temporal granularity: (a) information cost and (b) information ratio . All 95% con-
fidence intervals are non-overlapping (except for pairs (D1, Z6) and (D24, M6), as shown in
Additional File 1).
2.2 Assessing Utility
In order to assess the usefulness of mobile phone data at the various spatial and temporal gen-
eralization levels, we collected data from a quantitative survey targeted to experts with exper-
ience in research and analysis of mobile phone data for development and humanitarian action.
In particular, the survey’s population were experts who took part in D4D-Senegal 2014, the
open innovation data challenge based on anonymous records of Orange’s mobile phone users in
Senegal (26). Thirty two D4D experts—members of academia and research institutions around
the globe—opted in to respond the survey. Notably, the pool represented a diversity of twenty
five research institutions, across fourteen countries and five continents; and a spread of domain
foci in health, transportation and urban planning, national statistics, and others (see Table 2).
The survey asked experts to consider a scenario in which they were provided with CDRs
from a large metropolitan region in the developing world, including all call communications of
a large representative sample of the population in the region. Experts rated on a scale from 1 to
10 the usefulness of such data in their research domains, if provided generalized at the various
spatio-temporal granularity levels shown in Figure 1 (screenshots in Additional File 2).
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Table 2: Experts data.
Number of experts 32
Number of institutions 25
Continents North America, South America, Asia,
Africa and Europe.
Countries Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA.
Domain focus of respondents Health 20.5%, Transportation and Urban
Planning 34%, National Statistics 20.5%,
and Others 25%
3 Results
3.1 Reidentification Results
We analyzed a mobile phone dataset D comprising phone calls of 1.4M people across a large
metropolitan region in the developing world over a month in 2013. From it we derived gen-
eralized datasets for each combination of spatial and temporal granularity levels g ∈ {ZIP,
District,Municipality} × {1h, 6h, 12h, 24h}.
The spatial granularity levels used were ZIP code, district, and municipality polygons, which
partition the space in 56, 156, and 2130 polygons with average areas of 101, 36, and 3 km2
respectively. The temporal granularity levels used were time slices with duration of 1 hour, 6
hours, 12 hours, and 24 hours. For example, under dataset DZ6 —generalized at ZIP code and 6
hours granularity— a call issued at 4 pm from ZIP code 02139 by one user is indistinguishable
from a call issued at 7 pm by another user in the same ZIP code. We computed the information
cost c(Dg) and information ratio r(Dg) of reidentification associated to each generalized dataset
Dg. Figure 1 shows the results.
We observe that for the most granular dataset, DZ1, it takes on average 2.6 bits—i.e., data
points—to reidentify an individual, which represents 7% of that individual’s data
(
c(DZ1) = 2.6
and r(DZ1) = 7%
)
. This means that a prying third party with outside knowledge of 7% of an
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individual’s data could reidentify her and obtain the remaining 93%. In contrast, we observe that
for the least granular datasetDM24, reidentification requires an average of 32 data points, or 51%
of an individual’s data
(
c(DM24) = 32 and r(DM24) = 51%
)
. Hence, if DM24 is published, a
prying third party requires on average outside knowledge of about 51% of an individual’s data
to reidentify her and obtain the remaining 49%.
3.2 Utility Results
Figure 2 shows the experts assessment of data utility for each granularity level. We observe that
data usefulness decays as the data is generalized spatially and temporally, with values ranging
from 9.3 to 4.0 for the most and least granular datasets (DZ1 and DM24).
U
til
ity
Figure 2: Utility results. Usefulness of mobile phone metadata per generalization profile. Grey
bars denote bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. Spatial granularity levels are Z = ZIP code,
D = district, and M = municipality.
3.3 Privacy-Utility Tradeoff
Figure 3 shows results on the privacy-utility tradeoff. Each point represents a generalized dataset
Dg assessed on usefulness and reidentification risk, where the optimal position corresponds to
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the top right corner—high usefulness and hard reidentification.
We observe a sharp tradeoff between usefulness and privacy. The most granular dataset
DZ1 is the most valuable, with usefulness score of 9.3; however, it is also the dataset most
prone to reidentification, where on average a third party with outside knowledge of only 7%
of an individual’s data can reidentify the individual and gain the remaining 93% of personal
information. Conversely, the least granular dataset DM24 is the least valuable, with usefulness
score of 4; yet it’s also the dataset least prone to reidentification, where on average a third party
requires outside knowledge of 51% of an individual’s data to gain the remaining 49% of personal
information.
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95% confidence bands
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Figure 3: Privacy-Utility trade-off in mobile phone data. Utility vs. reidentifica-
tion risk in mobile phone data for development, across spatial and temporal granularities
{ZIP,District,Municipality} × {1h, 6h, 12h, 24h}. The more useful the dataset, the less
auxiliary information is needed to reidentify its individuals. Conversely, while data generaliza-
tion increasingly hinders reidentification, it strongly diminishes datasets’ value.
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Figure 3 also shows that the tradeoff is not strict. Generalization levels such asD24, Z24,M1,
and Z12 are Pareto-suboptimal, or dominated. For example, D24 and M24 have similar use-
fulness, however an adversary requires about 65% more outside information to reidentify an
individual in M24 than in D24
(
r(M24) = 51% and r(D24) = 29%
)
.
The tradeoff in Figure 2 implies that, while generalization increasingly hinders reidentific-
ation, it strongly undermines data utility. This highlights the complimentary roles of coarsen-
ing and data sharing models in enabling use while controlling risks. For example, datasets
most prone to reidentification—such as D1, Z6, and Z1, with reidentification information ratio
r ≤ 10%—could be shared only under strict models, such as precomputed indicators, or the use
of open algorithm platforms (27, 28). Figure 2 also implies that even highly coarse datasets can
be vulnerable to reidentification, and hence should not be made fully public. However, we may
want to share more broadly datasets posing more moderate reidentification risks—such as M24,
with reidentification information ratio r > 50%—, through models similar to those used in
D4D challenges (26), where data is accessed by a limited number of semi-trusted parties under
non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). Similarly, datasets posing moderate-high reidentification
risks—such as those with 10% < r < 50%—, could be shared under additional control mech-
anisms, such as remote access with adjustable disclosure controls via Q&A architectures, and/or
accountability and deterring incentive schemes (29). See (30, 31) for details and discussion on
modern data sharing models and protocols.
4 Conclusions
The present work shows for the first time the notorious trade-off between the societal value
of mobile phone data for development and humanitarian action, and the reidentification risk to
which individuals in it are exposed. Because data generalization directly erodes data’s value, it
cannot be regarded as a silver bullet solution for preserving privacy in high-dimensional datasets
(32). Yet, coupled with data-sharing models that provide adjustable degrees of accountability
and security, it may help find the right balance between privacy and utility.
This work assessed data utility as the value provided to experts in the analysis of mobile
phone data for development and humanitarian action. This approach is particularly germane
when considering purpose-specific data sharing, such as in the case of poverty mapping, trans-
portation planning, or assisting response efforts upon natural disasters. We anticipate future
work focusing on the trade-offs of mobile phone data usage in alternative domains, such as
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marketing and credit scoring.
The formal measures of reidentification risk here proposed can provide meaningful and intu-
itive summaries of the information requirements, and information gains, associated with reiden-
tification. Ultimately, we hope this work helps promote participation of broader audiences in
reflecting upon data privacy tensions, as societal preferences are indispensable inputs for resolv-
ing where systems should sit along the privacy-utility spectrum.
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Fig 2. Reidentification results for datasets at varying levels of spatial and
temporal granularity. Comparison of unicity, information cost, and information
ratio.
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